可变投资金额机制对自愿参与公共物品博弈的影响研究

王帅, 许照锦, 张连众

系统工程理论与实践 ›› 2022, Vol. 42 ›› Issue (1) : 155-171.

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系统工程理论与实践 ›› 2022, Vol. 42 ›› Issue (1) : 155-171. DOI: 10.12011/SETP2020-1632
论文

可变投资金额机制对自愿参与公共物品博弈的影响研究

    王帅1, 许照锦2, 张连众3
作者信息 +

Research on the influence of variable investment amount mechanism on the voluntary public goods game

    WANG Shuai1, XU Zhaojin2, ZHANG Lianzhong3
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文章历史 +

摘要

公共物品对社会发展有重要的保障作用，其私人自愿供给一直是学术界热议的话题之一.基于现实中公共物品投资金额存在个体异质性且可以动态调整的考虑，在传统固定投资自愿参与公共物品博弈中引入了可变投资金额机制，此时个人不仅可以选择是否提供公共物品，还可以决定提供多少公共物品，这种更符合实际的模型设定使博弈结果对现实问题有更强的解释力.结果表明：可变投资金额机制对社会合作水平的提高存在"双刃剑效应"，主要体现在只有收益率适中的情况下，可变投资公共物品博弈均衡时的合作者比例才会比固定投资的更高.尽管如此，可变投资金额机制仍能在大多数情况下提高社会平均收益和公共物品供给总量，在一定程度上缓解了"公地悲剧".研究发现，增加投资金额上限会使合作者比例先小幅提高然后降低，同时，孤独者收益的增加对社会合作水平有倒U型影响，这主要与三种策略的收益之差变化有关系.此外，在混合策略调整过程中对上一轮收益适当的反应强度有助于社会合作的出现和合作水平的提高.本研究为现实中公共物品私人自愿供给问题提供了新的视角和理论依据.

Abstract

Public goods play an important role in social development. Private voluntary supply of public goods has always been one of the hot topics in academia. Based on the consideration that the amount of public goods investment in reality has individual heterogeneity and can be adjusted dynamically, this paper introduces the variable investment amount mechanism in the traditional fixed investment voluntary public goods game. Individuals can not only choose whether to provide public goods, but also decide how many public goods to provide. This more realistic model makes the game results have more explanatory power to the real problems. The results of this paper show that there is a double-edged sword effect on the improvement of social cooperation level by the mechanism of variable investment amount, which is mainly reflected in that only when the rate of return is moderate, the proportion of cooperators in the game equilibrium of variable investment will be higher than that of fixed investment. However, the variable investment amount mechanism can still improve the average social income and the total supply of public goods in most cases, which alleviates the tragedy of the commons to a certain extent. It is found that increasing the upper limit of investment amount will lead to a small increase in the proportion of cooperators and then a decrease in it. The increase of the income of the loners has an inverted U-shaped effect on the level of social cooperation, which is mainly related to the change of the income difference of the three strategies. Besides, in the process of adjusting the mixed strategy, the appropriate response intensity to the last round of income is conducive to the emergence of social cooperation and the improvement of cooperation level. This study provides a new perspective and theoretical basis for the private voluntary supply of public goods in reality.

关键词

公共物品博弈 / 可变投资金额 / 自愿参与 / 演化博弈

Key words

public goods game / variable investment amount / voluntary participation / evolutionary game

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王帅 , 许照锦 , 张连众. 可变投资金额机制对自愿参与公共物品博弈的影响研究. 系统工程理论与实践, 2022, 42(1): 155-171 https://doi.org/10.12011/SETP2020-1632
WANG Shuai , XU Zhaojin , ZHANG Lianzhong. Research on the influence of variable investment amount mechanism on the voluntary public goods game. Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice, 2022, 42(1): 155-171 https://doi.org/10.12011/SETP2020-1632
中图分类号： F062.6    F224.32   

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天津市自然科学基金（20JCYBJC01020）
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