分包商利他偏好真的有利吗?——以公共产品技术创新委托研发为例

武柏宇, 仲伟俊, 梅姝娥

系统工程理论与实践 ›› 2022, Vol. 42 ›› Issue (1) : 172-183.

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系统工程理论与实践 ›› 2022, Vol. 42 ›› Issue (1) : 172-183. DOI: 10.12011/SETP2020-1640
论文

分包商利他偏好真的有利吗?——以公共产品技术创新委托研发为例

    武柏宇, 仲伟俊, 梅姝娥
作者信息 +

Is the subcontractor's altruism beneficial?—Take commissioned research and development of public good technological innovation as an example

    WU Baiyu, ZHONG Weijun, MEI Shu'e
Author information +
文章历史 +

摘要

为厘清公共产品技术创新委托研发中分包商的利他偏好是否有利于公共部门效益的提升,本文构建单委托人-双代理人模型,讨论随机依赖下分包商利他偏好对最优合同和公共部门期望收益的影响.研究表明:分包商利他偏好与随机依赖具有相同的作用力,都提高了公共部门使用相对绩效合同的优势;分包商利他偏好并不总是有利于公共部门期望收益的提升;公共部门不希望两个分包商具有同等强度的利他偏好,相反希望双方具有非对称的利他偏好,且低能力水平分包商的利他偏好强度越强越好;公共部门可以从双方利他偏好强度差异中获益,但要注意偏好强度与能力水平的匹配.

Abstract

To clarify whether the subcontractors' altruistic preferences are conducive to the public sector, this paper constructed a principal-agent model to study the influence of subcontractors' altruism on the commissioned research and development strategy of public goods technological innovation under the stochastic dependencies. The results show:Stochastic dependence and altruism have the same force, which improves the advantage of relative performance evaluation. The altruism of subcontractors is not necessarily conducive to the increase in the expected benefits of the public sector. The public sector does not want both of his subcontractors to behave equal intensity of altruistic preference. Instead, public sector can only profit when the subcontractors are asymmetrical, and the stronger the intensity of altruism of contributor with low capability, the more beneficial to expected benefits. The public sector can benefit from the difference in the strength of the altruism, but pay attention to the matching of preference and capability.

关键词

公共产品技术创新 / 委托研发 / 利他偏好 / 合同类型

Key words

public goods technological innovation / commissioned research and development / altruism / contract type

引用本文

导出引用
武柏宇 , 仲伟俊 , 梅姝娥. 分包商利他偏好真的有利吗?——以公共产品技术创新委托研发为例. 系统工程理论与实践, 2022, 42(1): 172-183 https://doi.org/10.12011/SETP2020-1640
WU Baiyu , ZHONG Weijun , MEI Shu'e. Is the subcontractor's altruism beneficial?—Take commissioned research and development of public good technological innovation as an example. Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice, 2022, 42(1): 172-183 https://doi.org/10.12011/SETP2020-1640
中图分类号: G304   

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基金

国家自然科学基金(71871054)
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