可再生清洁能源与传统能源清洁利用:发电企业能源结构转型的演化博弈模型

柴瑞瑞, 李纲

系统工程理论与实践 ›› 2022, Vol. 42 ›› Issue (1) : 184-197.

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系统工程理论与实践 ›› 2022, Vol. 42 ›› Issue (1) : 184-197. DOI: 10.12011/SETP2021-0149
论文

可再生清洁能源与传统能源清洁利用:发电企业能源结构转型的演化博弈模型

    柴瑞瑞, 李纲
作者信息 +

Renewable clean energy and clean utilization of traditional energy: An evolutionary game model of energy structure transformation of power enterprises

    CHAI Ruirui, LI Gang
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文章历史 +

摘要

传统能源的清洁利用和纳入可再生清洁能源是电力企业能源结构低碳化转型的着力点.本文考虑可再生能源和传统煤炭清洁利用"双轮驱动",构建了政府部门与发电企业间演化博弈模型,分析政府部门电力补贴政策与发电企业选择能源结构的演化稳定均衡,讨论传统能源清洁利用和可再生清洁能源包容式发展边界条件.研究发现,发电企业高碳化发电模式转换到清洁型模式的演化过程中,存在着周期解或政府补贴政策下发电企业采取综合能源发电的初始态势等过渡状态;政府补贴优惠政策支持促进了发电企业清洁技术创新成本的降低,推动了电力能源低碳化转型的新模式和新业态;可再生清洁能源与传统能源清洁利用容量占比值依赖于两种能源发电预期收益、两种类型的政府补贴及其带来的环境效益.

Abstract

The clean use of traditional energy and the incorporation of renewable clean energy have become the focus of the low-carbon energy structure transformation of power enterprises. Considering the "two-wheel drive" of renewable energy and the clean utilization of traditional coal, we construct an evolutionary game between government departments and power enterprises, analyzes the evolutionary stable equilibrium of government subsidy policies and power enterprises' choice of energy structure, and discusses the boundary conditions for the inclusive development of the clean use of traditional energy and renewable clean energy. The results show that there are transitional states such as periodic solutions or the government taking non-subsidy and the enterprise taking integrated energy power generation states in the evolution process of transitioning to the clean power generation mode. With the support of government preferential policies, enterprise reduces the cost of clean technology innovation and promotes low-carbon energy structure transformation. In addition, the ratio of renewable clean energy to traditional power capacity depends on the expected benefits of different energy generation, types of government subsidies and their environmental benefits.

关键词

能源结构低碳化转型 / 演化博弈 / 发电企业 / 可再生能源

Key words

low-carbon transformation of energy structure / evolutionary game / power enterprise / renewable energy

引用本文

导出引用
柴瑞瑞 , 李纲. 可再生清洁能源与传统能源清洁利用:发电企业能源结构转型的演化博弈模型. 系统工程理论与实践, 2022, 42(1): 184-197 https://doi.org/10.12011/SETP2021-0149
CHAI Ruirui , LI Gang. Renewable clean energy and clean utilization of traditional energy: An evolutionary game model of energy structure transformation of power enterprises. Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice, 2022, 42(1): 184-197 https://doi.org/10.12011/SETP2021-0149
中图分类号: C931   

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基金

国家自然科学基金(91747105,72101236);国家社会科学基金(15BGL087)
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